5 The Soviet Movement

A conversation I had with Mao Tse-tung concerning the much-disputed events of the spring of 1927 seemed to me of sufficient interest to mention here. It was not part of his autobiography, as he told it to me, but it was important to note as a personal reflection on what was a turning-point experience in the life of every Chinese Communist.

I asked Mao whom he considered most responsible for the failure of the Communist Party in 1927, the defeat of the Wuhan coalition government, and the whole triumph of the Nanking dictatorship. Mao placed the greatest blame on Ch'en Tu-hsiu, whose "wavering opportunism deprived the Party of decisive leadership and a direct line of its own at a moment when further compromise clearly meant catastrophe."

After Ch'en, the man he held responsible for the defeat was Mikhail Markovich Borodin, chief Russian political adviser, who was answerable didirectly to the Soviet Politburo. Mao explained that Borodin had completely reversed his position, favoring a radical land redistribution in 1926, but strongly opposing it in 1927, without any logical support for his vacillations. "Borodin stood just a little to the right of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Mao said, "and was ready to do everything to please the bourgeoisie, even to the disarming of the workers, which he finally ordered."M. N. Roy, the Indian delegate to the Comintern, "stood a little to the left of both Ch'en and Borodin, but he only stood."He "could talk, "according to Mao, "and he talked too much, without offering any method of realization."Mao thought that, objectively, Roy had been a fool, Borodin a blunderer, and Ch'en an unconscious traitor.

"Ch'en was really frightened of the workers and especially of the armed peasants. Confronted at last with the reality of armed insurrection, he completely lost his senses. He could no longer see clearly what was happening, and his petty-bourgeois instincts betrayed him into panic and defeat."

Mao asserted that Ch'en was at that time complete dictator of the Chinese Party, and took vital decisions without even consulting the Central Committee. "He did not show other Party leaders the orders of the Comintern, "according to Mao, "or even discuss them with us."^[1] But in the end it was Roy who forced the break with the Kuomintang. The Comintern sent a message to Borodin ordering the Party to begin a limited confiscation of the landlords' land. Roy got hold of a copy of it and promptly showed it to Wang Ching-wei, then chairman of the Left Kuomintang Government at Wuhan. The result of this caprice^[2] is well known. The Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang by the Wuhan regime, which soon afterward collapsed, having lost the support of regional warlords, who now sought safety in compromises with Chiang Kai-shek. Borodin and other Comintern agents fled to Russia, and arrived there in time to see the Opposition crushed and Trotsky's "permanent revolution"discredited, while Stalin set out in earnest to "build socialism[Stalinism?]in one country."

Mao did not think that the counterrevolution would have been defeated in 1927 even if the Communist Party had carried out a more aggressive policy of land confiscation and created Communist armies from among the workers and peasants before the split with the Kuomintang. "But the soviets could have got an immense start in the South, and a base in which, afterwards, they would never have been destroyed."

In his narrative of himself Mao had now reached the beginning of the soviets, which arose from the wreckage of the revolution and struggled to build a victory out of defeat. He continued：

"On August 1, 1927, the Twentieth Army, under Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, and in cooperation with Chu Teh, led the historic Nanchang Uprising, ^[3] and the beginning of what was to become the Red Army was organized. A week later, on August 7, an extraordinary meeting[Emergency Conference]of the Central Committee of the Party deposed Ch'en Tu-hsiu as secretary. I had been a member of the political bureau of the Party since the Third Conference at Canton in 1924, and was active in this decision, and among the ten other members present at the meeting were：Ts'ai Ho-sen, P'eng P'ai, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai.^[*] A new line was adopted by the Party, and all hope of cooperation with the Kuomintang was given up for the present, as it had already become hopelessly the tool of imperialism and could not carry out the responsibilities of a democratic revolution. The long, open struggle for power now began.

"I was sent to Changsha to organize the movement which later became known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising. My program there called for the realization of five points：(1) complete severance of the provincial Party from the Kuomintang, (2) organization of a peasant-worker revolutionary army, (3) confiscation of the property of small and middle, as well as great, landlords, (4) setting up the power of the Communist Party in Hunan, independent of the Kuomintang, and (5) organization of soviets. The fifth point at that time was opposed by the Comintern, and not till later did it advance it as a slogan.

"In September we had already succeeded in organizing a widespread uprising, through the peasant unions of Hunan, and the first units of a peasant-worker army were formed. Recruits were drawn from three principal sources——the peasantry itself, the Hanyang miners, and the insurrectionist troops of the Kuomintang. This early military force of the revolution was called the 'First Division of the First Peasants' and Workers' Army.' The first regiment was formed from the Hanyang miners.^[*] A second was created among the peasant guards in P'ing Kiang, Liu Yang, Li Ling and two other hsien of Hunan, and a third from part of the garrison forces of Wuhan, which had revolted against Wang Ching-wei. This army was organized with the sanction of the Hunan Provincial Committee, but the general program of the Hunan Committee and of our army was opposed by the Central Committee of the Party, which seemed, however, to have adopted a policy of wait-and-see rather than of active opposition.

"While I was organizing the army and traveling between the Hanyang miners and the peasant guards, I was captured by some min-t'uan, working with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang terror was then at its height and hundreds of suspected Reds were being shot. I was ordered to be taken to the min-t'uan headquarters, where I was to be killed. Borrowing several tens of dollars from a comrade, however, I attempted to bribe the escort to free me. The ordinary soldiers were mercenaries, with no special interest in seeing me killed, and they agreed to release me, but the subaltern in charge refused to permit it. I therefore decided to attempt to escape, but had no opportunity to do so until I was within about two hundred yards of the min-t'uan headquarters. At that point I broke loose and ran into the fields.

"I reached a high place, above a pond, with some tall grass surrounding it, and there I hid until sunset. The soldiers pursued me, and forced some peasants to help them search. Many times they came very near, once or twice so close that I could almost have touched them, but somehow I escaped discovery, although half a dozen times I gave up hope, feeling certain I would be recaptured. At last, when it was dusk, they abandoned the search. At once I set off across the mountains, traveling all night. I had no shoes and my feet were badly bruised. On the road I met a peasant who befriended me, gave me shelter and later guided me to the next district. I had seven dollars with me, and used this to buy some shoes, an umbrella, and food. When at last I reached the peasant guards safely, I had only two coppers in my pocket.

"With the establishment of the new division, I became chairman of its Party Front Committee, and Yu Sha-t'ou, a commander of the garrison troops at Wuhan, became commander of the First Army. Yu, however, had been more or less forced to take the position by the attitude of his men; soon afterwards he deserted and joined the Kuomintang. He is now working for Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking.

"The little army, leading the peasant uprising, moved southward through Hunan. It had to break its way through thousands of Kuomintang troops and fought many battles, with many reverses. Discipline was poor, political training was at a low level, and many wavering elements were among the men and officers. There were many desertions. After Yu Sha-t'ou fled, the army was reorganized when it reached Ningtu. Ch'en Hao was made commander of the remaining troops, about one regiment; he, too, later on betrayed. But many in that first group remained loyal to the end, and are today still in the Red Army——men such as Lo Jung-huan, ^[*] political commissar of the First Army Corps, and Yang Li-san, now an army commander. When the little band finally climbed up Chingkang-shan they numbered in all only about one thousand.^[4]

"Because the program of the Autumn Harvest Uprising had not been sanctioned by the Central Committee, because also the First Army had suffered some severe losses, and from the angle of the cities the movement appeared doomed to failure, the Central Committee now definitely repudiated me.^[**] I was dismissed from the Politburo, and also from the Party[General]Front Committee. The Hunan Provincial Committee also attacked us, calling us 'the rifle movement.' We nevertheless held our army together at Chingkangshan, feeling certain that we were following the correct line, and subsequent events were to vindicate us fully. New recruits were added and the division filled out again. I became its commander.

"From the winter of 1927 to the autumn of 1928, the First Division held its base at Chingkangshan. In November, 1927, the first soviet was set up in Tsalin[Ch'aling]on the Hunan border, and the first soviet government was elected.^[*] Its chairman was Tu Chung-pin. In this soviet, and subsequently, we promoted a democratic program, with a moderate policy, based on slow but regular development. This earned Chingkangshan the recriminations of putschists in the Party, who were demanding a terrorist policy of raiding, and burning and killing of landlords, in order to destroy their morale. The First Army Front Committee refused to adopt such tactics, and were therefore branded by the hotheads as 'reformists.' I was bitterly attacked by them for not carrying out a more 'radical' policy.

"Two former bandit leaders near Chingkangshan, named Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-t'sai, joined the Red Army in the winter of 1927. This increased the strength to about three regiments. Wang and Yuan were both made regimental commanders and I was army commander. These two men, although former bandits, had thrown in their forces with the Nationalist Revolution, and were now ready to fight against the reaction. While I remained on Chingkangshan they were faithful Communists, and carried out the orders of the Party. Later on, when they were left alone at Chingkangshan, they returned to their bandit habits. Subsequently they were killed by the peasants, by then organized and sovietized and able to defend themselves.

"In May of 1928, Chu Teh arrived at Chingkangshan and our forces were combined. Together we drew up a plan[at the first Maoping Conference**]to establish a six-hsien soviet area, to stabilize and consolidate gradually the Communist power in the Hunan-Kiangsi-Kwangtung border districts, and, with that as a base, to expand over greater areas. This strategy was in opposition to recommendations of the Party, which had grandiose ideas of rapid expansion. In the army itself Chu Teh and I had to fight against two tendencies：first, a desire to advance on Changsha[the capital of Hunan]at once, which we considered adventurism; second, a desire to withdraw to the south of the Kwangtung border, which we regarded as 'retreatism'[capitulationism]. Our main tasks, as we saw them then, were two：to divide the land, and to establish soviets. We wanted to arm the masses to hasten those processes. Our policy called for free trade[with the White areas], generous treatment of captured enemy troops, and, in general, democratic moderation.

"A representative meeting[the second Maoping Conference]was called at Chingkangshan in the autumn of 1928, and was attended by delegates from soviet districts north of Chingkangshan. Some division of opinion still existed among Party men in the soviet districts concerning the points mentioned above, and at this meeting differences were thoroughly aired. A minority argued that our future on this basis was narrowly limited, but the majority had faith in the policy, and when a resolution was proposed declaring that the soviet movement would be victorious, it was easily passed. The Party Central Committee, however, had not yet given the movement its sanction. This was not received till the winter of 1928, when the report of proceedings at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow, reached Chingkangshan.

"With the new line adopted at that Congress, Chu Teh and I were in complete agreement.^[5] From that time on, the differences between the leaders of the Party and the leaders of the soviet movement in the agrarian districts disappeared. Party harmony was re-established.

"Resolutions of the Sixth Congress summarized the experience of the 1925-27 revolution and the Nanchang, Canton, and Autumn Harvest uprisings. It concluded with approval of the emphasis on the agrarian movement. About this time Red armies began to appear elsewhere in China. Uprisings had occurred in western and eastern Hupeh, in the winter of 1927, and these furnished the basis for new soviet districts. Ho Lung in the west and Hsu Hai-tung* in the east began to form their own worker-peasant armies. The latter's area of operations became the nucleus of the Oyuwan Soviet, ^[**] to which later on went Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien* and Chang Kuo-t'ao. Fang Chih-min and Hsiao Shih-ping had also begun a movement along the northeastern frontier of Kiangsi, adjacent to Fukien, in the winter of 1927, and out of this later developed a powerful soviet base. After the failure of the Canton Uprising, P'eng P'ai had led part of the loyal troops to Hailufeng, and there formed a soviet, which, following a policy of putschism, was soon destroyed. Part of the army, however, emerged from the district under the command of Ku Ta-chen, ^[*] and made connections with Chu Teh and myself, later on becoming the nucleus of the Eleventh Red Army.

"In the spring of 1928, partisans became active in Hsingkuo and Tungku in Kiangsi, led by Li Wen-lung and Li Shao-tsu. This movement had its base around Kian, and these partisans later became the core of the Third Army, while the district itself became the base of the Central Soviet Government. In western Fukien soviets were established by Chang Ting-ch'eng, ^[*] Teng Tzu-hui, ^[**] and Hu Pei-teh, who afterwards became a Social Democrat.

"During the 'struggle v. adventurism' period at Chingkangshan, the First Army had defeated two attempts by White troops to retake the mountain. Chingkangshan proved to be an excellent base for a mobile army such as we were building. It had good natural defenses, and grew enough crops to supply a small army. It had a circuit of 500 li and was about 80 li in diameter. Locally it was known otherwise, as Ta Hsiao Wu Chin[Big-Little Five Wells], the real Chingkangshan being a nearby mountain, long deserted, and got its name from five main wells on its sides——ta, hsiao, shang, hsia, and chung or big, small, upper, lower, and middle wells. The five villages on the mountain were named after these wells.

"After the forces of our army combined at Chingkangshan there was a reorganization, the famous Fourth Red Army was created, and Chu Teh was made commander, while I became political commissar. More troops arrived at Chingkangshan after uprisings and mutinies in Ho Chien's army, in the winter of 1928, and out of these emerged the Fifth Red Army, commanded by P'ng Teh-huai.^[**] In addition to P'ng there were Teng P'ing, killed at Tsunyi, Kweichow, during the Long March, Huang Kuo-nu, killed in Kwangsi in 1931, and T'ien Teh-yuan.

"Conditions on the mountain, with the arrival of so many troops, were becoming very bad. The troops had no winter uniforms, and food was extremely scarce. For months we lived practically on squash. The soldiers shouted a slogan of their own：'Down with capitalism, and eat squash！'——for to them capitalism meant landlords and the landlords' squash. Leaving P'eng Teh-huai at Chingkangshan, Chu Teh broke through the blockade established by the White troops, and in January, 1929, our first sojourn on the embattled mountain ended.

"The Fourth Army now began a campaign through the south of Kiangsi which rapidly developed successfully. We established a soviet in Tungku, and there met and united with local Red troops. Dividing forces, we continued into Yungting, Shangheng, and Lung Yen, and established soviets in all those counties. The existence of militant mass movements prior to the arrival of the Red Army assured our success, and helped to consolidate soviet power on a stable basis very quickly. The influence of the Red Army now extended, through the agrarian mass movement and partisans, to several other hsien, but the Communists did not fully take power there until later on.

"Conditions in the Red Army began to improve, both materially and politically, but there were still many bad tendencies. 'Partisanism, ' for example, was a weakness reflected in lack of discipline, exaggerated ideas of democracy, and looseness of organization. Another tendency that had to be fought was 'vagabondage'——a disinclination to settle down to the serious tasks of government, a love of movement, change, new experience and incident. There were also remnants of militarism, with some of the commanders maltreating or even beating the men, and discriminating against those they disliked personally, while showing favoritism to others.

"Many of the weaknesses were overcome after the convening of the Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Red Army, held in west Fukien[at Ku-t'ien]^[6] in December, 1929. Ideas for improvements were discussed, many misunderstandings leveled out, and new plans were adopted, which laid the foundations for a high type of ideological leadership in the Red Army. Prior to this the tendencies already described were very serious, and were utilized by a Trotskyist faction in the Party and military leadership to undermine the strength of the movement. A vigorous struggle was now begun against them, and several were deprived of their Party positions and army command. Of these Liu En-k'ang, an army commander, was typical. It was found that they intended to destroy the Red Army by leading it into difficult positions in battles with the enemy, and after several unsuccessful encounters their plans became quite evident. They bitterly attacked our program and everything we advocated. Experience having shown their errors, they were eliminated from responsible positions and after the Fukien Conference lost their influence.

"This conference prepared the way for the establishment of the soviet power in Kiangsi. The following year was marked with some brilliant successes. Nearly the whole of southern Kiangsi fell to the Red Army. The base of the central soviet regions had been established.

"On February 7, 1930, an important local Party conference was called in south Kiangsi to discuss the future program of the soviets. It was attended by local representatives from the Party, the army, and the government. Here the question of the land policy was argued at great length, and the struggle against 'opportunism, ' led by those opposed to redistribution, was overcome. It was resolved to carry out land redistribution and quicken the formation of soviets. Until then the Red Army had formed only local and district soviets. At this conference it was decided to establish the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. To the new program the peasants responded with a warm, enthusiastic support which helped, in the months ahead, to defeat the extermination campaigns of the Kuomintang armies."

^[*]Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was here chosen general secretary of the Politburo, replacing Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who was accused of "rightism"and dropped from the Politburo.

^[*]Miners who had been organized by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Yun. In forming a peasants' and workers' army, and soldiers' soviets and people's councils, Mao acted independently of the Central Committee and was reprimanded. By the time he had set up his first soldiers' soviets the CMT line had changed again. In November of 1927 the Central Committee expelled Mao from the Politburo for "rightism."All the basic work he did in Chingkangshan that winter was "illegal, "although Mao was not aware of it for some months. He was reinstated in June, 1928.

^[*]See BN.

^[**]Mao was reprimanded three times by the Central Committee and three times expelled by it. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, BN.

^[*]In the same month a "soviet"was established by P'eng P'ai in Hailufeng, but it was quickly destroyed.

^[**]Here Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh formed an alliance with Lin Piao, Ch'en Yi, Hsiao K'e, Ho Chang-kung, T'an Chen-lin, Chang Wen-ping, Hsia Hsi, and others, which held together against all pressure from Comintern-backed Politburo leader Li Li-san and, later on, the Moscow-educated returned students called the "Twenty-eight Bolsheviks."See Chapter 6] and BN.

^[*]See BN.

^[**]See Part Nine], Chapter 1.

^[*]One of Chang's recruits was Yang Ch'eng-wu, whom the author met in north Shensi in 1936. For both, see BN.

^[**]See BN.